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BOOK REVIEW
ADVANCES AND ALTERED PERSPECTIVES
IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
HONOR OF SAMUEL E. TIIORNE.

OF ENGLAND:

ESSAYS IN

Edited by Morris S. Arnold, 1
2 Sally A. Scully, 3 and Stephen D. White. 4
Thomas A. Green,

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. i98i. Pp.
xx, 426. $25.00.

Reviewed by R.H. Helmholz5
The appearance of a volume of essays dedicated to Professor Thorne makes something of an event. Surprisingly, it is
the first Festschrift for a historian of English law to have
appeared on either side of the Atlantic. Miscellaneous collections of essays have appeared before, but neither Maitland,
Holdsworth, nor Plucknett had enough disciples or colleagues
to produce a Festschrift. Now come these fourteen essays,
written by some of the most prominent and promising of contemporary legal historians and carefully edited by four of
Thorne's recent students. The volume testifies to a flourishing
interest in legal history and to the personal affection and esteem felt for Professor Thorne by his colleagues.
If one looks for a precedent, perhaps the closest is the
Festschrift published nearly fifty years ago by the pupils and
6
friends of the constitutional historian Charles H. McIlwain.
Besides acknowledged preeminence, Professors Mcflwain and
Thorne share several characteristics. Both have concentrated
on the history of English institutions, with occasional excursions beyond that subject. Both have devoted parts of their
careers to editing scholarly texts. 7 Both have focused much of
their work on the intersection of law and government.8 And
Altheimer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
2 Professor of Law and History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
3 Associate Professor of History, San Francisco State University.
4 Associate Professor of History, Wesleyan University.

s Professor of Law and History, Washington University; Visiting Professor of Law,
University of Chicago.
6 ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY IN HONOR OF CHARLES HOWARD

MCILWAIN (1936) [hereinafter cited as MCILWAIN ESSAYS].
7 See, e.g., T. EGERTON, A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES (S. Thorne ed. 1942); C. MCILWAIN, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF
JAMES I (1918).
' See, e.g., C. MCILWAIN, Magna Carta and Common Law, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD 127-77 (1939); Thorne, What Magna Carta Was,
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both were reaching the end of teaching careers at Harvard
University when the essays in their honor were published. 9
The essays in the Thorne and Mcflwain volumes may
themselves be profitably compared. In the manner traditional
to Festschriften, the essays deal with disparate subjects, but
many in the recent volume cover legal and constitutional problems also considered in the earlier one. The overlap is not
complete; Thorne's greater concentration on legal problems
and Mcllwain's work on political theory are mirrored in their
respective collections. Donald Sutherland's instructive study
of fourteenth century pleading in the Thorne essays, 10 and
Paul Palmer's essay on the role of public opinion in political
theory in Mcllwaln's,"1 would each look very much out of
place in the other volume. Even so, it is remarkable how
closely related are many of the subjects the essays treat. This
reflects the continuing close connection between the legal and
the constitutional history of England. That affinity has persisted, perhaps even intensified, because legal records have
increasingly been used to cast new light on old constitutional
doctrines.
Once the similarities in subject matter have been noted,
however, the differences in the detail, approach, and general
conclusion of most of the essays are striking. Absent from the
recent essays are what Charles Gray describes as "the large
ways of taking hold" of the great problems and currents of
constitutional government (p. 195).12 Where the essayists of
the older volume saw the conscious unfolding of principles of
constitutional government, the newer essayists see self-interest
and happenstance at work. They have an aversion to seeing
the present in the past. Moreover, a much greater reliance
upon manuscript evidence, particularly that provided by court
records, has carried legal historians into the study of courts
and issues that occupied only the periphery of the field fifty
in S. THORNE, W. DUNHAM, P. KURLAND & I. JENNINGS, THE GREAT CHARTER:
FOUR ESSAYS ON MAGNA CARTA AND THE HISTORY OF OUR LIBERTY 3, 3-19 (1965).

9It is noteworthy that Professor Thorne helped to compile a bibliography for
Mclwain when called upon to do so by Italian editors. See Bibliografia degli scritti
di Charles Howard McIlwain, in C. MCILWAIN, LA RIVOLUZIONE AMERICANA: UNA
INTERPRETAZIONE COSTITUZIONALE at cxlvi, cxlvi-cl (N. Matteucci trans. 1965)
(Italian translation of C. MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1923)).
10 Sutherland, Legal Reasoning in the Fourteenth Century: The Invention of
"Color" in Pleading, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE 182, 182-94 (1981) [hereinafter cited as THORNE
ESSAYS].

1 Palmer, The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory, in MCILWAIN
ESSAYS, supra note 6, at 230.
12 See infra pp. 733-34.

1982]

BOOK REVIEW

years ago. English legal history is now a broader and more
detailed field of study than it was at the time of the McIlwain
Festschrift.
I.
The reluctance of recent scholars to see the unfolding of
legal principles in legal events is well illustrated by the
comparison of two essays, one from the present volume and
the other from the McIlwain collection, that both deal with
criminal trial procedure: Paul R. Hyams' study of the reasons
trial by ordeal disappeared from the royal courts 13 and Samuel
Rezneck's earlier account of developments in treason prosecutions under the Tudors. 1 4 Although both are concerned with
"modernization" of the law and both emphasize methods of
judicial proof as the key to understanding the process, their
explanations of the sources of change are dramatically
different.
Rezneck notes that the Tudor period witnessed considerable activity in the law of treason.1 5 Sixty-eight statutes
touched on the subject between 1485 and 1603,16 an astonish-

ing figure for an age less enamored with legislation than our
own. The number of treason trials was also large. Two countervailing currents are reflected in these statutes and in the
surviving trial records. The Tudors expanded the range of
actions and words that might subject one to the terrible penalties of the treason statutes. At the same time, there was
pressure to protect the accused by restricting prosecution based
on hearsay evidence. The "two witness" rule gradually worked
its way into English law. Rezneck moves through this story
briskly and confidently. He sees these developments as realizations of great themes - the rise of the modern state, the
eternal conflict of conscience between duty to God and duty
to earthly, sovereign, and the role of mobilized and liberal
public opinion in forcing change on a reluctant legal profession. The State Trials furnish his focus; the "requirements of
a modern state," 17 along with the government's "sensitiveness
13 Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, in
THORNE ESSAYS, supra note io, at 90, 90-126.
14 Rezneck, The Trial of Treason in Tudor England, in MCILWAIN ESSAYS, supra

note 6, at 258.
Is The subject is ample enough to have warranted a recent monograph. J. BELLAMrY, THE TUDOR LAW OF TREASON (1979).
16 Rezneck, supra note 14, at 262.
17 Id. at 288.
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to public opinion," 18 spurred the development of the modern
treason trial. Rezneck is well aware of tragic inequities suffered in specific trials, but he sees this darker side as merely
a temporary delay before the modern ideal could be fully
realized near the close of the seventeenth century.
In Hyams' essay on the disappearance of the ordeal, this
assurance and this thematic development are gone. The approach to problems and the explanation of developments are
vastly different. Hyams denies that the demise of the ordeal
in the thirteenth century resulted from royal or ecclesiastical
policy. Nor did public opinion (if this existed at all) play any
role in the process. Instead, Hyams finds explanations in the
immediate practical advantages to the community and the selfinterest of those involved in trial litigation.
The traditional account, ably restated in a recent article, 19
credits the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) with revolutionizing
the law of proof by forbidding the clergy to participate in
ordeals. This clerical ban forced litigants to turn to more
rational forms of proof, of which the jury is the shining example. Theologians and canon lawyers, having concluded that
ordeals were theologically and practically unsound, forced the
change through. According to this account, the Council's decree reflected a deliberate policy change and was ultimately
the work of intellectuals caught up in the great Renaissance
of the High Middle Ages.
It is a stirring theme. But Hyams tells us that we cannot
believe it. His skeptical scrutiny of many routine cases and
careful parsing of official pronouncements lead him to conclude
that by 1215 the ordeal had long since been discredited in
ordinary practice. Too often, it had been employed unscrupulously, to influence local opinion or blacken an opponent's
reputation. Its continued use was restricted to cases of serious
crimes, in which it served as "a deterrent or quasi punishment"
(p. ioo). The Fourth Lateran Council's decree was largely
irrelevant, the product of intellectuals tardily recognizing that
reality had outrun them. "Men's mundane needs, and not the
belated, banal pronouncements of leaders of church and state,
explain English development." (P. 125). Where Rezneck saw
grand themes in his account of the evolution of legal procedure, Hyams sees only the gradual evolution dictated by practical necessity.

I8 Id. at 282.
19 Baldwin, The Intellectual Preparationfor the Canon of 1215 against Ordeals,
36 SPECULUM 613 (i96").
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The same desire to shun all modern preconceptions about
the nature of legal change emerges from other essays in the
Thorne Festschrift. Eric Ives, for example, contributes a fresh
analysis of the history of the law of sanctuary, a means for
felons to avoid prosecution by taking refuge within certain
church precincts. He demonstrates from two sixteenth century
cases that complex family history and the King's immediate
need to put down one family's local "power-base" along the
River Severn were responsible for decisions that historians
previously had regarded as "a timely vindication of national
interest over a now outmoded privilege" (p. 320).20 In place
of that simple account of modernization, Ives provides an
"untidy, complicated, multifaceted piece of human experience"
(p. 320). The same may be said of Harold Garrett-Goodyear's
investigation of the Tudor revival of quo warranto proceedings, which required local men to account for the rights they
exercised in the King's name. 2 1 Although these proceedings
may ultimately have worked to enhance the power of the
Crown, at the time they were primarily contests between local
rivals, who sought to use royal position to further immediate
ends. Generalizations about the emergence of the modern state
out of medieval particularism, so prevalent in the essays of the
McIlwain Festschrift, have all but disappeared from the newer
essays.
In the same way, clear foreshadowings of modern doctrine
cease to predominate in J.L. Barton's learned account of contingent interests in sixteenth century land law. 22 Read without
modern preconceptions, the early cases look much different
from the propositions for which they are cited in property law
hornbooks. The sixteenth century cases show not clear exposition of black letter rules but rather inconsistency, hesitant
change, frequent disagreement among the judges, concern for
the fiscal needs of the Crown, and even the influence of the
lawyers' own interests. The picture is not a simple one.
S.F.C. Milsom's essay on inheritance by women may be
singled out as a particularly convincing demonstration of what
the cases suggest when read carefully without anachronism. 2 3
20 Ives, Crime, Sanctuary, and Royal Authority under Henry VIII: The Exemplary
Sufferings of the Savage Family, in THORNE ESSAYS, supra note io, at 296, 296-320.
Ives contrasts his views with those expressed on the same subject in a Festschrift for
A.F. Pollard published io years before the McIlwain volume. See Thornley, The
Destruction of Sanctuary, in TUDOR STUDIES 182 (R. Seton-Watson ed. 1924).
21 Garrett-Goodyear, The Tudor Revival of Quo Warranto and Local Contributions
to State Building, in THORNE ESSAYS, supra note io, at 231, 231-95.
22 Barton, Future Interests and Royal Revenues in the Sixteenth Century, in
THORNE ESSAYS, supra note io, at 321, 321-35.
23 Milsom, Inheritance by Women in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries,
in THORNE ESSAYS, supra note io, at 60, 60-89.
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Milsom asks why the English common law rules regulating
inheritance rights of women took the form they did. His
answer - that the common law rules grew from the hardening
of repeated private choices and of perceived moral obligations
into the force of law reinforces the point made in his
Maitland Lectures 24 that, where a later age would see ownership and inheritance of land, men in the twelfth century saw
possibilities for choice among claimants offering personal loyalty. The essay is not about royal or judicial decisions. Still
less is it about any precursor of women's rights (or lack of
rights). It is about the way in which customary arrangements
imperceptibly attain legal status. In a sense, this may be a
great theme. Certainly it is an important one. But it does not
depend on the orderly progression towards an ideal of constitutional or judicial rights so prevalent in the McIlwain essays.
There is too much chance, too much accident, for such an
explanation.
II.
The second development in English legal history that is
evident in the essays of the newer volume is the broadening
ambit and increasing specialization of the subject, extending
to topics that once seemed mere background to the course of
legal and constitutional growth. Nothing has been more important in bringing about this development than the exploration of record sources. Painstaking reading of manuscript
court records is gaining new devotees and producing important
findings on traditional questions as well as in new areas of
inquiry. The contrast of old and new approaches can be seen
clearly in another pair of essays from the two volumes, both
involving the canon law of the medieval Church: Charles Donahue on proof by witnesses in the Church courts 25 and Mary
Hume Maguire on the ex officio oath administered in those
tribunals. 26 Both essays deal with the procedure used in the
Church courts. Both authors begin by setting out the formal
rules found in the canon law texts and elaborated by canonists
and English church councils. Thereafter, the essays are vastly
different.

24

S. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM (1976).

25 Donahue, Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval England: An

Imperfect Reception of the Learned Law, in THORNE ESSAYS, supra note io, at 127,
127-58.
26 Maguire, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath ex Officio as Administered
in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, in MCILWAIN ESSAYS, supra note 6, at 199.
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In the McIlwain collection, Maguire's essay seeks to trace
the antecedents of the modern privilege against self-incrimination. Persons involved in ecclesiastical trials, civil or criminal, customarily swore the oath de veritate dicenda at the
start of litigation. (The phrase "ex officio oath" has no canonical warrant.) During the seventeenth century, this oath
came under attack from some lawyers in the common law
courts, ostensibly because it forced men to promise in advance
to answer truthfully questions that might subject them to punishment. The oath might be required even before they knew
the precise charges against them. Particularly when this canonical procedure was coupled with secular penalties, as it was
in the newly created Court of High Commission, the oath
could be made to appear sinister and could thus provide a
pretext for attacking ecclesiastical institutions that were hated
for other reasons. In tracing the history of the oath, Maguire
finds some evidence that its use had occasioned bitterness long
before the constitutional conflicts of the seventeenth century.
However, Maguire treats the canonists' oath principally as
background to the establishment of the common law privilege
against self-incrimination. Without examining ecclesiastical
court records to see how the oath was actually used, she
concludes that the oath's real importance lay in its disrepute
during the seventeenth century. Thereby it helped to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination, "this important contri27
bution to the liberties of England."
Donahue's essay in the Thorne Festschrift deals with the
canonical procedure in its own right, and unlike Maguire, he
has examined the records of the Church courts in detail.
Where connections with the history of English common law
can be seen, Donahue effectively points them out. But he
brings the ecclesiastical practice to the forefront. Donahue sets
out to discover how strictly the Church courts observed the
formal canon law. He begins with the canonical texts and
academic pronouncements on the qualifications of witnesses.
Against the backdrop of these rules he sets the evidence of the
court records in order to study the broader question of the
"reception" of legal rules in everyday practice.2 8 Donahue
presents three findings. First, in the face of explicit rules to
the contrary, the ecclesiastical courts routinely considered tes-

27
28

Id. at 229.
Donahue's use of the term "reception" may be slightly misleading, for it normally

denotes incorporation of a foreign system of law, whereas the ecclesiastical courts
were intended to be regulated directly by the canonical texts.
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timony of unqualified witnesses, such as serfs, criminals, and
paupers. Second, the evidence of testes de auditu, that is,
persons who were not eyewitnesses, was heard and could
sometimes determine the outcome of litigation, despite canonical rules to the contrary. Third, the ecclesiastical judges
exercised greater discretion in the evaluation of testimony than
the canon law texts allowed them. The academic canonists
strove to narrow the scope of judicial discretion, yet, Donahue
concludes, court records show that judges in fact enlarged it.
Perhaps Donahue has slightly exaggerated the rigidity of
the academic canonists' treatment of witness testimony in order
to make his point, but there is no denying the range or the
force of the evidence he has presented. His conclusion is that
legal receptions do in fact occur but that their effects are subtly
modified by existing practice and outside pressures. 29 One
need not accept this idea or even the precise arguments advanced in its support (although this reviewer does) to come
away with admiration for the essay. It opens up new source
material, it widens our range of interest to include new subjects, and it asks important questions. Although Donahue's
essay cannot end with the ringing assertion of Maguire's that an important liberty had been secured - it presents a far
deeper and more convincing picture of a topic that had been
undeservedly slighted by past scholarship.
Expansion of interest to once esoteric courts and themes
through greater use of record evidence characterizes several
other essays in the Thorne Festschrift. John Beckerman provides a much needed analysis of local court records in his
study of the role of affronts to personal honor in the early
history of trespass. 30 He makes a persuasive argument that
thirteenth century Englishmen considered monetary recovery
for dishonor or shame an open possibility. His explanation of
the reason that these grounds of damages failed to take hold
in the royal courts - that recovery for intangible losses was
left to local and ecclesiastical courts - cannot be a complete
answer. Study of later local court records shows that recovery
for dishonor and shame ceased to be awarded, or even sought,
during the course of the fourteenth century. 3 1 However, this
objection does not impair the value of the evidence Beckerman
29 See especially the recent treatment that has sparked interest in many aspects of
the subject. A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974).
30 Beckerman, Adding Insult to Iniuria" Affronts to Honor and the Origins of

Trespass, in THORNE ESSAYS, supra note io, at 159, I59-81.
31 The evidence supporting this statement will be given in detail in the reviewer's
forthcoming Selden Society volume, Cases on Defamation. See also the characterization of defamation in Y.B. Trin. 12 Hen. 7, f. 22a, 24b, pl. 2 (1497).
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presents. In particular, the influence of the civil law at the
local level, seen in the use of forms and ideas drawn from the
actio iniuriarum in the supposedly lowly local courts, puts
those courts in a new light.
Thomas G. Barnes similarly uses manuscript reports of the
Court of Star Chamber in a subtle and persuasive exploration
of the challenges to the court's power raised by Brereton's
Case.32 Barnes links his discussion to the traditional attacks
on the Star Chamber, but in his hands the court becomes more
than the unconstitutional bogeyman it has been to earlier historians. Because it brings to light the court's own internal
development and positive accomplishments, his account is ultimately more interesting and more believable than the old
version.
Exploration of record evidence has also brought positive
results in more traditional subjects of interest, as in J.H.
33
Baker's essay on the origins of the doctrine of consideration.
34
The problem has long been debated.
Was consideration a
new idea in the sixteenth century or did it grow out of an
older notion of quid pro quo used in actions of debt? Was it
a doctrine imported from civil law or one developed indigenously? Baker explores the plea rolls and unprinted case reports to answer both of these questions. His immediate quest
is to discover how consideration first made its appearance in
assumpsit pleadings between i535 and 1585.

The results are

impressive. The first use of the phrase "in consideration of"
comes from 1539, but this by itself had no great importance.
The rolls reveal a long period of experimentation by the lawyers who drew up the pleadings and needed a connecting link
between the recited bargain and the promise to pay money in
actions of assumpsit. Various formulas were tried. Some
caught on; others did not. The "doctrine" evolved gradually.
There was therefore no one source, and contemporary lawyers
themselves did not say that they were using anything more
explicit than the moral principles of reciprocity and reliance.
In the sense that these principles were also part of earlier
English law, the doctrine of consideration was old. In the
32

Barnes, A Chesire Seductress, Precedent, and a "Sore Blow" to Star Chamber,

in THORNE ESSAYS, supra note zo, at 359, 359-82.
33 Baker, Origins of the "Doctrine" of Consideration, 1535-1585, in THORNE
ESSAYS, supra note io, at 336, 336-58.
34 See, e.g., C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAw: TORT
AND CONTRACT 395-443 (1949); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAWV
OF CONTRACT 316-488 (1975); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. I

(1888); Barton, The Early History of Consideration, 85 LAW Q. REV. 372 (1969);
Salmond, The History of Contract, 3 LAw Q. REv. 166, 171-79 (1887).
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sense that these principles were newly molded into a regular,
more formal shape, the doctrine was new.
Baker's treatment of the question of consideration's indigenous or foreign origin is more definite. In his view, the
doctrine is decidedly English. He rejects the notion that the
civil law played any role in shaping the growth of the common
law doctrine. Surely there is room for a more open mind here.
Common law practitioners repeatedly used civil law terminology. Baker writes this off as "borrowing language, not legal
doctrine" (p. 351). But why should they have thought the
language useful? And did they really know nothing of contemporary developments in the law of the civilians? The essay by
D.E.C. Yale on the authority of Bracton in the common law
courts shows the willingness of lawyers to rely upon that trea35
tise, although they well knew that it contained Roman law.
This suggests at least the possibility that lawyers were open to
ideas drawn from outside the confines of the Year Books and
plea rolls. 36 Carrying the question further requires study of
continental developments, but the results may be as complex
and rewarding as is Baker's demonstration of the way consideration was used in its earliest appearances on the plea rolls.
III.
Practitioners of legal history will have room to disagree
about some of the conclusions found in the essays of the
Thorne Festschrift. Perhaps Professor Thorne himself would
take exception to some of the interpretations advanced. The
more intensive use of record sources, the expansion of inquiry
to once esoteric subjects, and the distrust of broad ideas as
motivations for men's actions have not led to consensus. On
the whole, however, the results have been good. So far, dis35 Yale, "Of No Mean Authority": Some Later Uses of Bracton, in THORNE
ESSAYS, supra note xo, at 383, 383-96.
36 There is additional evidence pointing in the same direction, suggesting greater
receptivity toward outside influences among early common law practitioners than their
modem counterparts are willing to acknowledge. See, e.g., J. BARTON, ROMAN LAW
IN ENGLAND 30-32 (lus Romanum Medil Aevi, Pars V, I3a, 1971); Coquillette, Legal
Ideology and Incorporation I: The English Civilian Writers, 1523-z607, 61 B.U.L.
REV. r (1g8i); Helmholz, The Roman Law of Guardianshipin England, 13oo-16oo,
52 TuL. L. REV. 223 (1978); Levack, The Proposed Union of English Law and Scots
Law in the Seventeenth Century, 1975 JURID. REV. 97; N6rr, Das Streitprogramm:
Eine Historisch-vergleichende Skizze, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR FRITz BAUR 537 (W.

Grunsky, R. Stilrner, G. Walter & M. Wolf eds. 1981); Sherman, The Romanization
of English Law, 23 YALE L.J. 318 (1914); Donahue, Book Review, 84 YALE L.J. 167,
178 (1974) (reviewing B. LEVACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND, 1603-I641
(1973)).
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agreement has not degenerated into squabbling. And the advances in deepening our understanding of the past have been
undeniable.
The new approach to explaining the reasons for legal
change is the most debatable modern feature shown in these
essays. Have we really benefited from a perspective that sees
in litigation not the settling of legal principles and the growth
of constitutional doctrine but only the clash of self-interest by
actors who have no thought beyond immediate advantage?
Does the discovery that litigants want most of all to win their
lawsuits mean that matters of larger policy count for nothing?
Put that way, it appears that we are in danger of seeing only
trees and missing the undoubted existence of forests. The
danger is real, at least if the arguments are pushed to extremes.
On the whole, however, the larger issues have not been completely ignored. Constitutional principles may have lost their
primacy, but the best of the modern work continues to illuminate them. Only those historians unwilling to master the
lawyer's approach to problems have written off principles and
issues 37of law as entirely irrelevant to the settlement of disputes.
In able hands, the newer perspective has served principally
as a safeguard against anachronism. Charles Gray's essay on
fifteenth century litigation over royal exemptions from parliamentary taxation furnishes a good example. 38 He shows that,
although it is too simple to imagine that there was any such
thing as a peculiarly "Lancastrian constitution," 39 the constitutional issues raised in litigation made sense in the context of
the times. The lawyers who argued the Year Book cases were
using the language most appropriate to settle the issues at
hand. Constitutional questions were present - indeed, we
can see them in clearer focus thanks to Gray's patient explication of the legal intricacies - but those issues were raised
in exactly the way constitutional questions then presented
themselves: in terms of royal grants of special privileges.
In contrast to this approach is a comparable essay in the
McIlwain volume, Max Adams Shepard's study of fifteenth
17 See, e.g., J. MADDICOTT, LAw AND LORDSHIP: ROYAL JUSTICES AS RETAINERS
IN THIRTEENTH- AND FOURTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1978).

3' Gray, Plucknett's "LancastrianConstitution," in THORNE ESSAYS, supra note
10, at 195, 195-230.
39 The phrase has a long history and was the subject of an earlier critical essay.

See Plucknett, The Lancastrian Constitution, in TUDOR STUDIES, supra note 20, at
161. The question now is precisely how the idea of a specially Lancastrian constitutionalism is anachronistic, and here Gray has the better of the argument.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

century political theory in the works of Fortescue. 40 Shepard
deals with large questions: nationalism, separation of powers,
the inalienable rights of Englishmen. He scarcely mentions a
narrow question of law or assesses the strength of a legal
argument. And he ends (this was 1935) by asserting that the
lessons of the fifteenth century demanded judicial approval of
Roosevelt's New Deal legislation. 4 1 Surely any loss in breadth
of vision in the recent essays is more than compensated for by
their greater clarity of insight.
The gain to legal history from the expansion of interest to
new record sources and new subjects of investigation has been
even more impressive. We have undeniably gained better perspective on the past. The work of Professor Thorne, whose
42
labor over and translation of the text known as Bracton
constitutes his magnum opus, shows the advantages to be won
from patient concentration on texts. The essays of the Festschrzft rightly honor his career as well as his person.
In only one respect do the newer essays suffer by comparison: they will not appeal immediately to most lawyers. The
McIlwain Festschrift is appealing in its easy handling of great
themes. The essays of the .Thorne volume are written primarily for specialists in legal history. Only A.W.B. Simpson's
graceful essay on the first known Anglo-Saxon laws escapes
the weight of specialization, and that essay was originally
written for a public occasion. 43 It is hard to imagine many
people, even among those generally interested in history, who
could read Emily Zack Tabuteau's contribution on the evolution of the knight's fee in eleventh century Normandy with
more than a distant sort of respect. 44 The essay does in fact
deserve respect, and its conclusion is important to the history
of feudalism, but it has none of the stirring appeal to general
principles that enlivens the earlier volume: Legal historians
at least historians of English law - are now talking mainly
to each other. It is a tribute to the influence of Professor
Thorne that there are now enough of them to ensure that there
will be listeners.
40

Shepard, The Political and Constitutional Theory of Sir John Fortescue, in

McILVAIN ESSAYS,
41 Id. at 318-i9.
42

supra note 6, at 289.

BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (S. Thorne trans. 1968-

,977) (four volumes).
43 Simpson, The Laws ofEthelbert, in THORNE ESSAYS, supra note io, at 3, 3-17.

44 Tabuteau, Definitions of FeudalMilitary Obligations in Eleventh-CenturyNormandy, in THORNE ESSAYS, supra note to, at iS, 18-59.

